FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE VALUE OF THE FIRM: A CROSS-SECTIONAL INDUSTRY STUDY OF NIGERIAN QUOTED FIRMS

 FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE VALUE OF THE FIRM: A CROSS-SECTIONAL INDUSTRY STUDY OF NIGERIAN QUOTED FIRMS

ABSTRACT

The controversy over the optimal capital structure question focuses on the effect of the addition of non-equity financing on the quality of the firm’s earnings and on the rate at which the earnings are capitalized. Theory posits that capital structure of a firm affects its shareholders‘return and risk, and consequently, the market value of shares, hence its significance in corporate financing decisions. This study therefore empirically examines the impact of financial structure decision on the value of Nigerian quoted firms. Cross-sectional time series data of 72 Nigerian quoted firms, for the 1997-2007 periods, were collated from the published annual reports and accounts of the companies, and from the Nigerian Stock Exchange Fact Books of the same period. Five hypotheses were proposed for the study, while the ordinary least square (OLS), fixed-effects (FE) and the gerneralised least square (GLS) regression were used on pooled and panel data to validate the hypotheses and to estimate the relationship between financial leverage and the different measures of firm value in Nigeria. The normalised values of earnings per share (EPS), profit after tax (PAT), price earning ratio (P/E ratio), earnings yield and dividend yields were used as the regressands; while total, long-term and short-term leverage measures alongside size and growth were used as regressors. Descriptive statistics on both the regressands and the regressors were also computed to complement the regression results. The results showed that, the sampled firms lever their financing, on the average by 56.7 percent, with current liabilities making up to 50.53 percent, while long-term liabilities make up the remaining 6.17 percent. They were however some variations in the use of leverage across industrial sectors. Secondly, the results also show that the financing leverage were made up of 0.0486 of capital market funds and 0.9514 money market funds; they were however some variations across industry groups, with 0.1302 standard deviation. Thirdly, as regards the impact of financial leverage on the value of the firm, the regression results showed evidence of a positive relationship between financial leverage and the different measures of firm value, at the .05 level of significance, with the exception of the long-term liability measure which was negatively but insignificantly related with most firm value proxies. The total and short-term liability measures had coefficients of 0.074 and 0.068 respectively with PAT, while the long-term measure showed a coefficient of -0.105, at a 0.05 level of significance. For the EPS measure, the coefficients were 0.0065, 0.039 and -0.136 for the total, short-term and long-term liability measures respectively. The PER measure showed the beta coefficients to be, 0.028, 0.026 and -0.003 for the total, short-term and long-term liability measures respectively. They were however, negative but significant relationship between earnings yield and dividend yield with financial leverage, having beta coefficients of -0.038 and -0.150 respectively, at a 0.05 level of significance. Fourthly, the above results validate previous empirical result that there is a positive relationship between leverage (when measured by short-term liabilities) and firm value, while it is negative when measured by long-term debts. It also provides empirical validation to the view that Nigerian firms are low levered. Furthermore, the results validate empirical findings in other corporate jurisdictions that there exist industrial patterns of financial leverage. Finally, it was found that the plausible reason for the low leverage of Nigerian quoted firms is attributable to the non development of the market for corporate financing in Nigeria.

CHAPTER ONE

1.0       INTRODUCTION

1.1       Background of the Study

One of the central issues in both the theory and practice of financial management is the problem of determining the optimal capital structure of the firm. Given capital market conditions and the array of investment opportunities, is there some optimal composition of liabilities and equity at which the value of the firm will be maximized? (Wippern, 1966). Extant theories of capital structure and financing decisions of firms suggest that there is an optimum financial structure, upon which a firm maximizes her value (Myers, 1984; Masulis, 1983; Taggart, 1977; Miao, 2005; Wippern, 1966; Miller, 1977). They also suggest that debt-equity mix has implications for the shareholders‘earnings and risk, which in turn, affects the cost of capital and the market value of the firm (Pandey, 2002).

The composition of the various means by which a firm is financed is known as the financial structure of that firm (Pandey, 2002). A revision of the financial structure could be achieved by increasing creditors‘claims, issuing more equities or retaining earnings. The difference between financial structure and capital structure lie in the tenor of the fixed commitment financing. Traditionally, short-term borrowings are excluded from the list of methods of financing a firm‘s capital expenditure (Pandey, 2002). This has however influenced the use of the term capital structure in literature. However it should be borne in mind that the management of both long-term and short-term financing is equally important to the firm, though they may differ theoretically – the neglect of either could spell doom for any firm. In most cases, the lack of working capital has resulted to liquidation of firms due to illiquidity. Both short-term and long-term financing have effects on the risks and returns of the firm.

Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that availability of sources of financing are jurisdictional, being influenced by the market conditions prevalent in each corporate jurisdiction. Empirical studies to this end abound. Borio (1990) for instance, classifies Japanese and Continental Europe firms as high leveraged firms, while the Anglo-American firms were classified as low leveraged firms. Rutherford (1988) using Organisation of Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) data presented evidence that firms in France, Germany and Japan are more highly levered than United States, and United Kingdom firms. The economics explanation to the differences in the pattern of leverage in the different corporate jurisdictions could be the extent and nature of financial intermediation, differences in institutional structures governing bankruptcy and debt negotiation, and differences in the market for corporate control (Borio, 1990, Frankel and Montgomery, 1991 and Berglof, 1990). There were however, deviations in empirical findings by Kertler (1986) and Mayer and Alexander (1990), due mainly to the nature of their leverage measures. They found that there were no major differences in the extent of leverage between Japan and United States firms; and that large German firms borrow less than UK firms (see also Rajan and Zingalese, 1995).

The above phenomena could be noticed among Nigerian firms. Due mainly to some institutional, market and cultural constraints, Nigerian firms patronize the short-term end of the financial markets more than the longer-term end. It was also noticed that most of the firms that closed shop in Nigeria, did so for lack of working capital, rather than long-term finances (Glen and Pinto, 1994; Adelagan, 2007; Ezeoha, 2007). Furthermore, Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001), notes that the major difference between developing and developed economies is that developing ones have substantially lower amounts of long-term debts. This also was consistent with the findings of Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (1999). This has the implication of limiting the explanatory power of capital structure in developing economies, if short-term debts are removed from the aggregates. This informs why this follow the pattern of other studies in using total debt to total capitalisation as the major measure of leverage, while having other measures as subsidiary test variables.

Both theory and empirics show that financial structure has some influence on the firm value. Financial leverage at first sight provides the potentials of increasing both returns and risks for shareholders (Wippern, 1966; Masulis, 1983; and Rajan and Zingalese, 1995). According to Pandey (2002) the role of financial leverage in magnifying the return of the shareholders is premised on the assumptions that the fixed-charges funds can be obtained at a lower cost than the firm‘s rate of return on net assets.

The controversy over the optimal capital structure question focuses on the effect of the addition of non-equity financing on the quality of the firm’s earnings and, thus, on the rate at which the earnings are capitalized. Does the addition of a moderate amount of fixed commitment financing result in demands by shareholders for an increase in the risk premium component of equity yields sufficient to offset the incremental earnings derived from the new financing? If investors respond in this manner, the value of the firm remains unaffected by changes in financial structure and it may be concluded that financial structure is of no consequence in a firm’s attempts to achieve the objective of wealth maximization for its stockholders. If, however, the increase in yield demanded by shareholders is either more or less than sufficient to offset the advantages of incremental earnings derived from additional non-equity financing, then financial structure will have an important effect on the value of the firm. In this latter case, financial structure decisions become important variables in pursuing the goal of maximization of shareholder wealth (Wippern, 1966).

The long term debt-equity mix of a firm is called its capital structure, while the term financial structure is used in a broader sense to include equity and all liabilities of the firm (ibid). Theory posits that capital structure affects shareholders‘return and risk, and consequently, the market value of shares (see for example, Masulis, 1983; Modigliani and Miller, 1958, 1963 and 1966; Miao, 2005; and Pandey, 2002), hence its significance on corporate financing decision.

A complex set of decisions creates a firm‘s capital structure. Capital structure dictates the funding sources tapped by the company and allocates risks and control rights to various parties. Pursued wisely, capital structure decisions should enhance value in financial markets (Chaplinsky, 1996). The modern traditional view of financial structure builds on M-M‘s theory, but concludes that a firm can pick an optimal mix of debt and equity by focusing on the tradeoffs between the tax benefits of debt and the potential costs of financial distress.

Conventional capital structure theories (Myers, 1977; Jensen, 1986) suggest that firms‘optimal capital structure is related to costs and benefits associated with debt and equity financing. With the optimal debt-to-equity mix, firms could achieve the lowest financing costs and consequently increase the value of shareholders (Sheel, 1994). Although the optimal mix varies from industry to industry (Kim, 1997) and from country to country (Wald, 1999), the financing structure puzzle is even more complicated in developing countries, where markets do not always work efficiently and controls and institutional constraints abound (Glen and Pinto, 1994). It is further reported that the banking system of the developing countries are incapable of providing the needed resources for private sector expansion, due mainly to government interventions, uncertain macroeconomic environment, and high reserve requirements which leaves the banks with little percentage of their deposits to lend freely.

Previous researchers have constantly found capital structure theories applicable when explaining financing decisions (Tang and Jang, 2006). Since Modigliani and Miller‘s (1958) capital structure irrelevance finding, researchers have searched for capital structure explanations primarily within the context of firm boundaries that are determined by explicit contracts among stakeholders including shareholders, debt holders, managers, and the government. The research in this stream of literature provides important insights into the effects of taxes, bankruptcy costs, information asymmetries, agency issues, and other frictions on corporate leverage decisions (Kale and Shahrur, 2007).

There is an extensive theoretical literature concerning optimal capital structure (see for example Modigliani and Miller, 1958 & 1963; Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Scott, 1976; Miller, 1977; and DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980, Miao, 2005; Bosshardt, 2003). However, there is little empirical evidence of a relationship between changes in capital structure and firm value (Excepting for a few like, Wippern, 1966; Masulis, 1983; Miao, 2005, Abor, 2005, Adelagan, 2007). In the best known test of an optimal capital structure model, Miller-Modigliani (Miller and Modigliani, 1963) reported evidence of a positive relationship between firm value and leverage which they attributed to a debt tax shield effect. According to Masulis (1983), their results appear suspect, because of seeming statistical problems they encountered when attempting to adjust for differences in the firms’ asset structures. Secondly, since only regulated firms were examined, there was also some concern that their empirical findings were influenced by some other extraneous variables like the regulatory environment in which these firms operated. There appears to be no strong evidence of a relationship between a firm’s value and the size of its debt tax shield uncovered since the Miller-Modigliani (1963) study.

Other capital structure studies have also focused on the tax advantages of debt (Modigliani and Miller, 1963), the choice of debt levels as a signal of firm quality (Ross, 1977; Leland and Pyle, 1977), the use of debt as an anti-takeover device (Harris and Raviv, 1988), agency costs of debts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977) and the role of debt in restricting managerial discretion (Jensen, 1986). The major work on the relationship between financial structure and the value of the firm are those by Nielsen (1961), Wippern (1964 & 1966), and Masilus (1983) which were mainly based on the United States environment. Yet the results of these studies generated further controversies, either because of the different variables used or by the statistical treatment of such variables. When checked against the main stream study by M-M (1963), there are usually some disagreements.

The controversy whether there is an optimum financing structure upon which a firm can maximize her value has endured over the years. Some normative views have also been presented in literature, like the traditional static trade-off theory, the M-M Non-relevance theory (1958), with latter modifications; Donaldson (1961) and Myers (1984) Pecking Order theory, and Miller (1977) Neutral Mutation theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) Agency Cost theory. The normative solutions as presented by the various theories hinge on efficiency, the investors, and the agents perception. The controversy over the Optimal Capital Structure question focuses on the effect of the addition of non-equity financing on the quality of the firm‘s earnings and, thus, on the rate at which the earnings are capitalized (Wippern, 1966).

There appears to be a surfeit of empirical studies on the determinants of capital structure, financing decisions, and related issues (see for example, Titman and Wessels, 1998; Brounen, Jang and Koedijik, 2006; Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-kunt, and Maksimovic, 2001; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Taggart, 1977; etc). Studies on the effects of these decisions on the value of the firm and shareholders wealth are relatively scanty, both in terms of country-specific and in terms of industry-specific studies. According to Elkelish and Marshall (2007) there seems to be no agreement among researchers about the impact of these decisions on firm value in practice. The famous “irrelevance” propositions by Modigliani and Miller (1958), which state that “the overall market value of any firm is completely independent of its capital structure, and that the expected  rate of return on the common stock of a geared firm increases in proportion to the debt/equity ratio”, have received some empirical support (See Carpentier and Suret, 2001). However, these propositions are widely claimed to be non applicable in practice due to the existence of some capital market imperfections (See Bradley et al., 1984).

However, financial structure is known to have different effects and impacts on a firm. For example, financial structure has been known to have impact on firms‘financial constraints (Baum, Schafer and Talavera, 2009), on firms‘growth (Liu and Hsu, 2004), on firms profitability (Abor, 2005), on firm value (Wippern, 1966; Adelagan, 2007; Masulis, 1983).

What emerges from the discussion is that the plethora of empirical studies already carried out on the subject matter, have not laid to rest, the controversies generated by the initial propositions. There is therefore a justification and need to join the empirical search by focusing on a cross-sectional industry study of the relationships between financial structure and the value of firms in Nigeria (this is achieved by studying selected firms from fifteen industries quoted in the Nigerian Stock Exchange).

This study is somewhat peculiar for some obvious reasons. First, there has been no known empirical study on the subject matter for the Nigerian jurisdiction, though Nigeria occupies a place of pride in the West African sub-region and African region generally. Secondly Nigeria poses a puzzle on the corporate financing pattern and corporate productivity, if viewed from the perspectives of liberal tax shield, lavish investment incentives and a friendly income tax regime (Adelagan, 2007; FIRS, 2002 as amended).

1.2       Statement of Problem

The importance of corporate financial decisions on the value of the firm has been at the heart of academic debate over recent decades. After the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958 and 1963), which was based on assumptions of an efficient capital market (a frictionless world), much of subsequent research has examined the effect of both capital structure and dividend policy decisions when the reality of capital market imperfections are introduced. These imperfections include a wide range of situations such as taxes; transaction costs, asymmetric information, and more recently, agency costs (see Iturriaga and Crisostomo, 2008). There is an extensive theoretical literature concerning optimal capital structure. However, there is little empirical evidence of a relation between changes in capital structure and firm value. In the best known test of an optimal capital structure model, Miller-Modigliani (1963) reported evidence of a positive relationship between firm value and leverage which they attributed to a debt tax shield effect. (Masulis, 1983).

Our knowledge of capital structure, according to Booth, Aivazian, Dermiguc-kunt and Maksimovic (2001), has mostly been derived from data from developed economies that have similar institutional framework. Financial decisions in developing countries are bound to be somehow different, being influenced by the peculiarities of their institutional framework and market conditions (Mayer, 1990), which are far from being perfect. Nigeria is obviously a developing country, with weak and often unstable institutional framework and an imperfect financial market. Added to this, is the fact that empirical studies relating to financial structure of firms in the Nigerian corporate jurisdiction is not only scanty but also not frontally directed on the subject matter. Isolated studies on defined influences on corporate financing decisions could be found, but detailed investigations on the impact of these decisions on the value of the firm is yet to be addressed.

Significant progress has been made in the development of the theory of financial structure issues and decision framework. The basis for important departures from the original Modigliani and Miller (1958 and 1963) theorems on the irrelevance of capital structure on the value of firms has become clearer. However, not enough is known about the empirical relevance of the different theories. Empirical work has unearthed some stylized facts on capital structure choice, but such evidence is largely based on the experience of firms in the United States, and it is not at all clear how these facts relate to different theoretical models. Without testing the robustness of these findings outside the environment in which they were uncovered, it is hard to determine whether these empirical findings are merely spurious correlations, let alone whether they support one theory or another (Rajan and Zingalese, 1995).

Few studies have also been carried out to prove that there are links between financial structure and firm value (Nielson, 1962; Wippern, 1964 and 1966; Masulis, 1983). Hence Rajan and Zingalese (1995) had decried the dearth of empirical studies on the effects financial structure decision on the firm, which as earlier noted appears to be scanty, both in country-specific and industry-specific studies. A more disturbing phenomenon is the apparent non-existence of developing countries studies, on the vexed issue of relationship between financial structure and firm value.

Be that as it may, it is a recognized theoretical fact that the primary motive of a firm in using financial leverage is to boost the shareholders‘return under favourable economic conditions. This is based on the assumption that fixed-commitment financing can be obtained at a cost lower than the firm‘s rate of return on net assets (Pandey, 2002). That being the case, to what extent does the Nigerian firms lever their financial structure? How has financial leverage of Nigerian firms impacted on the equity holders‟ returns, and the total value of the firm? This forms the basic challenge of this study.

Firms that are listed in the Nigerian Stock Exchange are found to be financed by both equity and debt (Adelagan, 2007). However statistics further show that Nigerian firms do not patronize the bond market (which represents the longer-term end of the capital market) intensively – For instance out of 194 listed companies in 2001, 49 companies patronized the bond market; while 46 out of the 205 listed companies in 2007, patronized the bond market (NSE, 2001, 2007 and Adelagan 2007). The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the financing pattern of Nigerian firms is biased; in favour of the short-term end of the market for corporate finance. This could have been responsible for the low contribution of the manufacturing sector to the gross domestic product (GDP) of Nigeria over the years, when considered from the perspective of the theory of financial leverage. Adelagan (2007), indicated that the contribution of the Nigerian manufacturing sector to the GDP has not been impressive, accounting for about 8.4% of the GDP in 1984, sliding to 4.2% in 1996 and 6.0% in 2000. The more recent trend shows the following rates: 3.50% to 3.80% for the years 2004 to 2007 respectively (CBN, 2007).

Could the above empirical evidence be as a result of the financing pattern of Nigerian firms, or some factors other than the financial structure? It is the desire of the researcher to investigate the impact of corporate financial structure on the value of Nigerian quoted firms.

1.3       Objectives of the Study

This study is set, on the whole, to empirically examine the impact of financial structure decision on the value of Nigerian quoted firms; the value of the firm being measured by the financial performance in terms of general income return on capital employed and profit after tax (ROCE and PAT), firm‘s solvency ratios, and firm‘s performance in terms of value to the investors price earning ratio (PE ratio), earnings per share (EPS), and Earnings yield. Below therefore are the specific objectives:

1. To determine the extent to which Nigerian quoted firms lever their financing.
2. To empirically determine the characteristics of the financing leverage of Nigerian quoted firms.
3. To determine the impact of financial leverage on the value of Nigerian quoted firms.
4. To compare the results of the study with previous theoretical and empirical studies.
5. To identify plausible reasons for any noticed phenomena in the financing structure of Nigerian quoted firms.

1.4       Research Questions

In the bid to achieve the objectives of this study, the researcher will attempt to answer the following questions:

1. To what extent does quoted firms in Nigeria lever their financing?
2. What are the major characteristics of the financing structure quoted firms in Nigerian?
3. What are the impacts of financial leverage on the value of Nigerian quoted firms?
4. To what extent is the country-specific study on the impact of financial structure on the value of the firm, in Nigeria consistent with prior studies?
5. What could have been responsible for the characteristics of the financing structure of Nigerian quoted firms?

1.5       Research Hypotheses

In the bid to achieve the objectives of the study the following hypotheses will be validated for the study, as stated below:

1. The Profit after Tax (PAT) of Nigerian firms is negatively related to the degree of firm‘s financial leverage.
2. The earnings yield of Nigerian firms is negatively but significantly related to the degree of firm‘s financial leverage.
3. The dividend yield of Nigerian firms is negatively related to the degree of firm‘s financial leverage.
4. The price earning (PE) ratio of Nigerian firms are negatively related to the degree of financial leverage of the firm.
5. The earnings per share of Nigerian firms are negatively related to the degree of financial leverage of the firm.

1.6       Scope of the study

Since this study is based on quoted firms in the Nigerian corporate jurisdiction, the scope of the study will be drawn from a number of quoted firms in the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), while the variables of interest is as those stated above, and the time period of the study will cover the period between 1997 and 2007.

From the most recent available profile of listed firms in Nigeria, there are 35 classification of industrial groups, including foreign listing, emerging markets, and memorandum quotations. The increase in the number of classifications was due to sector reclassification by the NSE in 2007, which introduced one sub-sector – Airline Services; and the renaming of ―Managed Funds‖ sub-sector to ―Other Financial Institutions‖ (NSE, 2008). The number of quoted companies, as at 2007, stood at 212 firms.

The study used about seven-two quoted Nigerian firms, from a cross-section of the different industrial groups (excluding the highly regulated industrial groups like, Power and Steel, Petroleum and the Banking Industrial groups), and for a time period spanning from 1997 to 2007, this is in keeping with previous studies along this line. Rajan and Zingalese (1995) used the same approach; they eliminated financial firms such as banks and insurance companies from their sample giving the reason of their leverage being strongly influenced by explicit (or implicit) investor insurance schemes such as deposit insurance. Furthermore, their debt-like liabilities are not strictly comparable to the debt issued by non-financial firms (see also Masulis, 1983; Miao, 2005; Abor, 2005; Pandey, 2001; Ezeoha, 2007). The criteria for their selection are outlined in the methodology section.

The variables relevant to this study, which are in line with prior related studies, are the various leverage ratios (the explanatory variables) as will be discussed under methodology, and the various performance indicators as the dependent variables (see Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper, 2003; Wippern, 1966; Masulis, 1983; Rajan and Zingalese, 1995; and Abor, 2005). These will be explained further in the methodology section.

1.7       Significance of the Study

The significance of this study is premised on two major pedestrians – first, the fact that the assumed objective of any firm is the profit motive or/and value maximisation; and secondly the currency of the study. There has been both theoretical and empirical debate as to the relationship between the financial structure of a firm and its value, whether as it relates to market value or to the residual value. There also have been speculations as to the impact of the financing structure of Nigeria firms, whether market based or bank based, and of what dominant tenor, without empirical evidences. This study therefore is going to fill the lacuna in both literature and empirical studies regarding the impact of leverage on the value in the Nigerian corporate jurisdiction. A study of this kind will prove to be beneficial to the various stakeholders of the Nigerian corporate world and to the academia in the following manner:

• The Corporate Nigeria

The result of this study, when communicated, will enlighten the corporate decision makers of Nigeria on the benefits/costs of their financing decision on their firms. This will come in the light of a better understanding of the benefits/costs of financial leverage, when proved or otherwise, that there is a relationship between leverage and firm value in the Nigerian jurisdiction.

• Corporate securities Holders

To the securities holders in Nigeria – whether equity, debt or hybrid; this study will be of immense benefit, as it will enlighten them better on their value added, in the performance of their firms of choice. They could begin to relate firm value with the financing structures of their target companies. Further still, this study has the ability to enlighten the various stakeholders of their stakes and share of the pie, in the event of failure.

• The Policy Makers

The various policy makers of the Nigerian corporate jurisdiction should benefit immensely from this study, since both the characteristics of the financial structure of Nigeria‘s quoted firms, and the impact of it on their performance/value will be empirically determined. It will enhance their policy decisions geared towards improving the productivity and profitability of the private sector.

• The Academia/Researchers

As earlier noted, this study is geared towards being a trailblazer in the study of corporate financing in the Nigerian jurisdiction, and therefore bound to instigate further empirical search on the subject matter; even as it will give some empirical impetus to existing notions about the financing patterns and their impacts on Nigerian quoted firms.

1.8       Limitations of the Study

Financial Structure and Firm Value: A Cross-Sectional Industry Study of Nigerian Quoted Firms, being wide and topical demands both human and financial resources, which usually is limited in supply. The following are deemed the major limitations to this study:

Finance: The first major constraint is financial resources, which a study of this magnitude demands. When considered in line with volume of data to be generated and the sample size, coupled with the fact that there is no central depository for all the required data, the financial constraints could then be appreciated.

Data Sourcing: The issue of sources of data can not be overemphasized. Some relevant data for the study are not easily available, and where they are it is at reasonable cost. Archiaval data like the like market values of some of the variables for the required time period (1997 – 2007), and the availability of the respective ten-year annual reports and statement of accounts of the sampled firms could pose some problems. Added to the issue of sourcing data, is a dearth of financial structure-related studies in the Nigerian jurisdiction. This posed some limitations when comparing the results of the study with previous ones.

Operational Definition of Terms

• Financial Structure (Corporate): The various means by which a firm is financed is known as the financial structure of that firm; it could be by increasing creditors‘claims, issuing more equities or retaining earnings. This is contrasted from capital structure, which refers to the firm‘s mix of long-term sources of fund and her equity share capital (Pandey, 2002). In this study the wide definition of financial structure is adopted, while the other narrow definitions are used for further test of robustness.
• Financial Structure (System-wide): This refers to institutions, technologies and rules that govern organisation of the inter-temporal exchange of payments at a point in time, in a given financial system (Thiel, 2001).
• Value of the Firm: the total value of the firm is defined as the value of equity shares plus the value of debts. This could be approached either from the net income (NI) or net operating income (NOI) approaches. In which case the formular is V = (S+D) = Ỹ/Ko = X/Ko;

Where: V = total value of the firm;

D = market value of debt;

S = market value of equity;

Ko = cost of capital;

Ỹ = expected net income;

X = net operating income. (See Pandey, 2002 for details).

It could also be defined as the investor‘s perception of the earnings stream of a firm‘s assets, and the rate at which the market capitalizes these earnings stream. This could be reported at book or market values. Commonly used indicators are, dividend yield, earnings yield, and other investor valuation ratios (see for instance, Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Wippern, 1966 and Masulis, 1983). 27

In this study the researcher used most of the commonly used variables in financial structure studies, at both the book and market values, as to achieve meaningful comparisons – variables as stated in the statement of research hypotheses.

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